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BOOK REVIEWS
The Rainbow of Experiences, Critical Trust and God: A Defense of Holistic 
Empiricism, by Kai-man Kwan. New York: Continuum, 2011. 314 pages. 
$120 (hardcover).
TYRON GOLDSCHMIDT, University of Notre Dame
The argument from religious experience is the most significant contribu-
tion of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion to natural theology. 
Other arguments for the existence of God have lately been introduced 
(e.g., the argument from consciousness) or significantly updated (e.g., 
contemporary variants of cosmological and teleological arguments), and 
may or may not be more powerful than the argument from religious expe-
rience. But none is at once as original, influential, powerful and accessible 
as the argument from religious experience, an argument which captures 
the grounds of so many ordinary religious believers (contrast the onto-
logical argument).
Kai-man Kwan recently composed the state-of-the-art essay on the argu-
ment for The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology,1 and now we have his 
book-length defense of the argument in The Rainbow of Experiences, Critical 
Trust and God. The book features prominently the approbation of Richard 
Swinburne, the most significant contributor to natural theology, at least 
since Aquinas, and largely responsible for the contemporary debate about 
the argument from religious experience. Expectations for this volume will 
be high; in other words, we risk being easily disappointed.
The book is divided into two parts. The first is devoted mainly, but not 
exclusively, to general epistemological preliminaries, critiquing the kinds 
of classical foundationalism and narrow empiricism that would threaten 
the project, and developing a more pluralistic and holistic empiricism in 
their place. The second part employs this epistemology in developing 
a cumulative case from various kinds of experience to the existence of 
God—experiences of the self and others, moral and aesthetic experience, 
intellectual and numinous experiences, among others. The book is broad 
1Kai-man Kwan. “The Argument from Religious Experience,” in The Blackwell Companion 
to Natural Theology, ed. W. L. Craig and J. P. Moreland (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), 498–552.
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in coverage, rich in arguments and broaching diverse areas in philosophy. 
This review can focuses on only a few of its parts.
I will first refer to the chapters from the first part not devoted to episte-
mology generally, chapters 1, 2 and 5. Chapters 1 and 2 are an introduction 
to the argument from religious experience and a case study of Wittgen-
stein respectively. The latter displays the diverse kinds of experience had 
by Wittgenstein, and their profundity—particularly since the experiences 
forced themselves against a philosophical worldview inimical to them. 
The study of Wittgenstein is one of two larger case studies, the other being 
of Einstein (142–146), the greater stein and no less significant with respect 
to religious experience. However, the studies invite controversy insofar 
as Wittgenstein and Einstein are both difficult to interpret on the topic of 
religion, and do not themselves draw from their experiences the conclu-
sion Kwan will draw.
Chapter 5 replies to three traditional objections to the argument from 
religious experience (from the corrigibility, theory laddenness, and privacy 
of the experiences), presents three general kinds of responses to the experi-
ences (theism, naturalism, and monism), and then outlines the argument. 
The replies to the objections are entirely successful, if for the most part 
familiar. However, the outline of the argument from religious experience 
is—unfortunately for a book devoted to the argument—a little clumsy.
First, the argument is ambiguous. The argument is initially presented 
as having two stages: first, an argument for a transcendent being, and, 
secondly, an argument for the personal nature of that being (92–94); inter-
estingly, this parallels the existence and identification stages of traditional 
cosmological arguments. But then the second stage of the argument ap-
pears to be a stand-alone argument from theistic experience (TE) and a 
rational principle, the Principle of Critical Trust (PCT; more on this below), 
to justified belief in God:
1. Type PCT is correct.
2. Theistic experience is a well-established type of experience.
3. It seems (epistemically) to S that God exists on the basis of a TE, E.
4. The theistic experience, E, is not defeated.
Therefore,
5. S is justified in believing that God exists. (94)
Secondly, the argument as set forth is not an argument for the exis-
tence of God—for “generic theism” (94)—as advertised, but for justified 
belief in God. Thirdly, the argument, simple as it is, is overly complicated. 
As the subsequent prose paraphrase of the argument recognizes, prem-
ises (1), (2), and (4) are alone sufficient for the conclusion that belief in 
God is justified.
Fortunately, redundant stages or premises do not deprive an argument 
of cogency. However, crucial premises that are not plausible do, and while 
474 Faith and Philosophy
Kwan devotes extensive effort to supporting premises (1) and (2), the sup-
port for (4) is lacking. To be sure, Kwan directs us here to chapters 4, 16 and 
17 in particular, which address various objections, including objections 
from radical constructivism and from diverse and disparate experiences, 
among others. However, the most powerful potential defeaters—the prob-
lems of evil and divine hiddenness—are neglected, which is surprising in 
a book of such broad coverage.
The other five chapters of the first part are devoted to developing and 
defending a holistic theory of experience and justification. Chapters 3 and 4 
develop Kwan’s theory; chapter 6 argues against the rival narrow empiri-
cist theory; chapter 7 argues for Kwan’s theory; and chapter 8 compares 
and contrasts this to yet other theories, displaying its superiority. Kwan’s 
“Critical Trust Approach” (CTA) steers a middle road between the epis-
temological extremes of a cynicism that leads to skepticism (if we should 
trust none of our experiences, then we should believe nothing) and a na-
ivety that leads to gullibility (if we should trust every experience, then we 
should believe anything).
At the heart of the approach is the “Principle of Critical Trust” that 
would have us believing things to be as they appear, unless and until we 
have reason for believing otherwise, e.g., in contrary appearances. Kwan 
carefully distinguishes between various formulations of the principle, di-
verging in scope (the kinds of experience they apply to) and strength (the 
degree of justification the experiences confer). The “Moderate Type PCT” 
at work in the argument above is stated as follows: “Every experience 
which belongs to a well-established type of experience provides prima 
facie justification for the embodied epistemic seeming” (75).
How well-established a type of experience is depends on the number 
of experiencers, the variability of the experiential situations, the frequency 
of experiences, and their explanatory and conceptual coherence. The prin-
ciple follows in the tradition of others, especially Swinburne’s Principle of 
Credulity: “If it seems (epistemically) to me that x is present then probably 
x is present unless there are special considerations to the contrary” (11). 
However, Kwan promises a “refinement of Swinburne’s epistemological 
approach” (73), particularly in distinguishing between the Type PCT and 
the Token PCT, which states simply that each token experience confers 
justification for the embedded epistemic seeming.
The motivation for favoring the Type PCT over the Token PCT alleg-
edly at work in Swinburne’s argument is the failure of the latter principle 
with respect to strange experiences: isolated appearances of e.g., ghosts 
(73) or UFOs (76) should not confer justification upon belief in such things, 
but they would given the Token PCT. They would not given the Type PCT, 
however, since they do not belong to well-established types. This cannot 
be a very significant advance over Swinburne, who was painstaking in 
qualifying his Principle of Credulity and emphasizing the considerations 
that can defeat any justification conferred by isolated appearances, and 
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such would surely include the bearing of background theory against 
ghosts and UFOs.
The first part of the book closes by contending that even if the attempt 
to display the superiority of the Critical Trust Approach with its PCT over 
rival epistemological frameworks fails, this does not mean that we are not 
justified in maintaining the PCT. Fair enough: there might be yet other 
arguments to be had for the approach or we might even be justified in 
maintaining it without any such arguments. However, Kwan then insists 
that the critic must show not only the failure of the approach but also the 
superiority of an alternative:
As long as we have reason to judge that the CTA is not worse than other 
approaches, and the CTA can withstand objections, theists have as much 
right to choose CTA as STA [the rival Selective Trust Approach] or other al-
ternatives. . . .  If the critics want to defeat the Transcendent ARE [argument 
from religious experience] completely, they can’t be content with showing 
that CTA is not necessarily compelling for all rational people. They also 
need to show that STA (or some more restricted framework) is superior to 
CTA. (134)
The point is made quickly but mistakes the dialectical situation. The critics 
need not show the superiority of rival approaches, but could be content 
in admitting that these likewise fail; there’s little consolation in having “as 
much right to choose CTA” as an alternative if there’s not much right to 
choose either. Whether or not we have a more plausible alternative, we 
could fairly reject the CTA if we could fairly reject Kwan’s argument. (To 
be sure, there is the condition that “the CTA can withstand objections.” 
However, if this means only some objections, then withstanding objections 
need not render a view justifiable; and, if it means all possible objections, 
then the proponent of the CTA still has a long way to go.) However, I think 
the approach is plausible, and that more than enough philosophers will 
agree with something similar enough to pursue Kwan’s argument further.
The next part of the book considers the rainbow of experiences that 
together with the CTA is supposed to yield the argument from religious 
experience. Chapter 9 considers our experience of the natural world, in-
cluding our experiences of the contingency, beauty, apparent design, and 
intelligibility of nature. Kwan does not treat traditional arguments from 
contingency or design here. Yet the debate about them is relevant: for 
example, critics attempt to show that the appearance of design is unreli-
able, since it can be explained without invoking design. They might thus 
grant the CTA along with the appearance of design while denying that 
this points towards design on the grounds that there are defeaters in the 
explanations not invoking design, and confirmed well enough by our other 
experiences. The chapter could also have been strengthened by a treatment 
of Del Ratzsch’s paper, “Perceiving Design.”2
2Del Ratzsch, “Perceiving Design,” in God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Mod-
ern Science, ed. Neil Manson (London: Routledge, 2003), 125–144.
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The chapter ends by summarizing the argument as an inductive argu-
ment in which the relative probabilities of the evidence on rival hypoth-
eses –P(e1,e2 … e6/Ht) versus P(e1.e2 … e6/Hn)—confirm theism. Such 
a strategy is also employed in chapters 11 and 12, and the second part of 
the book presents various explanatory arguments for theism, exploring 
how theism explains and accommodates a whole range of experiences 
better than do alternative worldviews: experience of the self (chapter 10); 
existential experience, including the quest for meaning and wholeness 
(chapter 11); interpersonal experience (chapter 12); moral experience, in-
cluding experiences of value, evil and conscience (chapter 13); aesthetic 
experience (chapter 14); intellectual experience, particularly of a prior 
intuitions (chapter 15); and religious and theistic experiences of various 
kinds (chapters 16 and 17).
However, nowhere are the probabilistic and explanatory strategies in-
troduced, and the connection between the arguments, on the one hand, 
and the CTA and PCT, on the other, is not always drawn explicitly. I take 
it that the arguments are essentially two-staged: the CTA secures the con-
tent of the experience as premises for the subsequent probabilistic and 
explanatory arguments for theism—at least where the experiences are not 
themselves direct theistic experiences and so do not fall neatly into place 
in premises (1) to (4) stated above. Thus, given the CTA, experiences of 
e.g., value point towards the existence of value; and, once the existence of 
value is granted, it is shown best accounted for in the theistic worldview. 
If this is the strategy, then it could have been more perspicuous; otherwise 
the design of the second part of the book obscures so much of the effort 
expended in the first part.
The arguments often attack the prospects of naturalistic accounts of 
experiences, thus bearing more strongly against naturalism than theism; 
by eliminating naturalistic candidates they do increase the plausibility of 
rival worldviews, including theism, but then there remain yet other rivals. 
For some readers, naturalism and a few of the other hypotheses Kwan 
addresses (such as monism with its impersonal absolute) will be the only 
viable contenders against theism, so that by eliminating them, theism 
is secured. But other readers will need more convincing that theism is 
a more plausible worldview than rivals incorporating the experiences or 
their objects, perhaps as irreducible and fundamental, without any theis-
tic ground.
Kwan begins to address such concerns at points. In chapter 13, for in-
stance, after arguing that naturalism cannot account for morality, he as-
sesses the alternative of a non-naturalistic but non-theistic moral realism 
(of the kind recently advocated by Michael Huemer, Russ Shafer-Landau, 
and Derek Parfit). Kwan raises various problems for this view (225–226). 
Some are pressing, albeit familiar, including the problems of knowledge 
of an inert moral realm, and of the ontological complexity in there being 
two realms, moral and non-moral. However, Kwan needs to explain fur-
ther how theism helps answer these problems: how does theism secure 
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knowledge, including God’s knowledge, of an inert moral realm? How 
does theism provide a unifying explanation of there being two realms? In 
God’s creating both realms? What would such creating amount to, espe-
cially if the fundamental moral facts are necessary?
Elsewhere the puzzles for naturalism are not even apparent. Chapter 10 
is devoted to establishing the existence of the self against what we are in-
formed is “the great controversy among philosophers” about its existence, 
and the “dominant” view among naturalist philosophers of mind that it 
must be “deconstructed” (162). While Kwan’s treatment of the existence 
of the self is interesting, there is not really any serious controversy about 
the self’s existence. To be sure, there is controversy about the nature of the 
self—as displayed in e.g., Eric Olson’s What Are We?,3 including a chapter 
on the view that there is no self, consideration of which might have been 
useful here. However, Kwan does not show how naturalism fails to ac-
count for the nature of the self, or, rather, why the failures of naturalistic 
accounts (all face objections, as Olson shows) is especially due to natural-
ism, and how theism can help.
Kwan saves the best for last. Chapters 16 and 17 are devoted respec-
tively to religious experience in general and theistic experience in particu-
lar, and are excellent. Kwan develops a careful taxonomy of religious and 
theistic experiences, and responds to various objections deftly and force-
fully. The constructivist objection from Steven Katz alleges that religious 
experiences are largely constructions from prior religious frameworks. 
Kwan replies by showing how experiences do not fit this mold, being had 
by people without prior belief, or with prior belief at odds with the ex-
perience, while not had by others with the right sort of prior belief. The 
objection from conflicting religious experiences alleges that experiences 
are too diverse and conflicting to be reliable. Kwan replies by showing that 
conflicts are prevalent in accounts of other kinds experience we take to be 
generally reliable (such as accounts of experiences of historical events), 
and that despite the conflicts there remains a common core to religious 
experiences.
Kwan also identifies here (277–278) and at various places (15–16, 119, 
129) objections based on what he terms “the super-reliability fallacy.” The 
fallacy is committed when a difference in favour of the epistemic status 
of one kind of experience is taken to undermine the epistemic status of 
another kind of experience; e.g., concluding from the greater reliability of 
ordinary sensory experience that religious experience is unreliable. Kwan 
deals decisively with such objections, and his identification and emphasis 
on the fallacy is important since, I think, the fallacy is behind a great deal 
of skepticism about religious experience.
The book promises a broad and holistic perspective influenced by 
Kwan’s Chinese background, emphasizing the “union of Heaven, earth 
and human being” (2), and it succeeds in large part by covering a wide 
3Eric Olson, What Are We? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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range of experience within an holistic epistemic setting. However, the book 
neglects religious experience within Chinese religious traditions, eastern 
religions more broadly, and non-Christian theistic religions. The Chinese 
subjects introduced are usually converts to Christianity or missionaries 
and, if not, at least invoked when they speak in favour of Christianity—
as are the practitioners of Eastern religions more generally (140, 232, 234, 
218–219, 268, 271). The monism more prevalent in Eastern religions is re-
jected quickly towards the end of Chapter 17. As for Judaism, the case of a 
secular kibbutznik becoming a religious Jew after a mystical experience is 
presented (260–261), but along with the case of Weil’s conversion to Chris-
tianity (259–260). Religious experience within Islam receives a single men-
tion (271).
On a few minor points, the indices are incomplete, and the book in-
cludes quite a few formatting errors, particularly in the offsetting of vari-
ous items in lists or principles (72, 78, 80, 81, 126) and other typographical 
errors, including an error in the header of every other page in Chapter 8.
While advancing the debate about religious experience, Kwan acknowl-
edges that his book will not be conclusive, particularly because of the 
limitations of space provided by a single volume. Skeptical readers will 
likely not be persuaded by this book. This owes in part to the sheer num-
ber of arguments and topics raised (and that then cannot be adequately 
addressed), but also to particular problems with the arguments, some of 
which I have identified in this review. However, to conclude that this is 
not a good book because it is not conclusive would be to commit some-
thing analogous to a super-reliability fallacy. After all, the book is often 
insightful, and even where the arguments do not persuade, they provoke 
much thought. The book will be of interest to philosophy students and 
philosophers of religion, particularly those working on religious experi-
ence and related topics in epistemology.
Inquiring About God: Selected Essays, Volume, 1 by Nicholas Wolterstorff, 
edited by Terence Cuneo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
313 pages. $85 (hardcover).
Practices of Belief: Selected Essays, Volume 2, by Nicholas Wolterstorff, edited 
by Terence Cuneo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 435 pag-
es. $85 (hardcover).
R. T. MULLINS, University of St Andrews
As I discussed with some graduate students at my university that I would 
be working on a review of Wolterstorff’s essays, they immediately became 
interested but asked, “When will a collection of his essays on theologi-
cal aesthetics become available?” What this question indicates is the wide 
